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Multinational corporations are increasingly seen as excessively big and powerful, and as 
dramatically increased in size and power. This perception has led to the view that the big 
corporations are threatening democratic institutions of the nation -states and that they pervert the 
cultural and social fabric of countries. In this paper we analyze the size of large corporations and the 
recent trends regarding this problem. Using value-added data (instead of sales) we found that 
multinationals are surprisingly small compared to the GDP of many nation -states. In addition, the 
size of multinationals relative to the size of nations has tended to decline somewhat during the last 
20 years. Finally, we argue that there is little evidence that the economic and political power of 
multinationals has increased in the last few decades. 




Multinationals are out of favor. This is not for the first time. During the 1960s and the 1970s 
multinational companies, especially the American variety, were seen as institutions increasingly 
bent on dominating the world. It was the time of the best-selling “The American Challenge” of Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber, which became very influential in Europe, and which argued that thanks to 
sophisticated management methods, large American enterprises would take over Europe and the 
world.  Being large and American was ugly in those days.   Then the 1980s came. Perceptions 
shifted completely. Instead of being perceived as evil forces, large corporations suddenly became 
the symbols of progress in an increasingly integrating world. The generations of yuppies were 
impatient to be hired by the symbols of success of the day, the large corporations, preferably 
American (Nasiri,1998).  
Since a few years the pendulum has swung again. Under the influence of the anti - globalist 
movement, big multinationals are out of favor. Like in the days of Servan - Schreiber, today’s best-
selling books on the subject argue that the multinationals have become so big that they threaten our 
democratic institutions and pervert our culture. In her book “The Silent Takeover” Hertz claims that 
the big multinationals have become so powerful that they destroy the very fabric of our democratic 
societies. In the same vein Naomi Klein argues that big corporations don’t sell physical but 
emotional products thereby changing and perverting our cultural landscape.   
The starting point of all these analyses is a double claim. First, multinational corporations are 
very big. The most popular way to express this is that among the 100 biggest “economies” in the 
world 51 are corporations and only 49 are  countries, giving the impression that large corporations 
are now larger than the average nation -state (see Anderson and Cavanaugh(2000) who were the first 
to use these numbers). The second claim is that the size of multinationals is greater than ever. It i s 
not difficult to find statistics that will buttress this claim. Indeed, measured in the dollar value of 
their sales and assets, multinational companies are bigger than ever. These two empirical claims 
form the backbone of much of the analysis in the anti globalist literature surrounding the excessive 
and pernicious power of multinationals (Sodagar,2006). In this paper we analyze these two claims. 
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First we try to measure the size of the large corporations of the world. In order to make sense we 
need a benchmark. This will be the nation-state. We will analyses the question of how big the big 
multinationals are in relation to countries. Second, we will study how the size of multinationals has 
evolved relative to the size of the same nation -states. Nobody will question the fact that the big 
multinationals are bigger than ever, but so are the economies of countries. The relevant question 
here is how the size of the multinationals has evolved relative to that of countries.   
 
The size of large corporations   
When comparing the size of corporations to that of nations the sales of these corporations are 
almost invariably set against the GDP of countries. Thus, when anti -globalists claim that out of 100 
economies 51 are corporations and only 49 are countries they compare the sales of corporations with 
the GDP of nations. Sales and GDP, however, are not comparable. The GDP of a nation is the sum 
of the values added by each producer. It is not the sum of total sales of these producers. The reason 
why one does not want to add the total sales of all producers is that this would lead to a lot of double 
counting. To give a few examples. Bethlehem Steel sells steel wire to Bridgestone during, say 2002. 
During the same year Bridgestone sells tires to Ford Motor company. The latter then sells cars to 
final consumers also in 2002.  If we add the sales of the steel, the car companies we will count the 
steel wires three times. As a result, we will overestimate the value of what is produced in the 
country. In order to avoid this overestimation, economists only count the value added in the three 
companies. They then count steel wire only once, i.e. when produced and sold by Bethlehem Steel. 
They subtract the value of the steel wire (and of all the other intermediate deliveries) from the sales 
of Bridgestone and Ford. Many other examples of double and triple counting can be given when 
sales are added. Thus, when comparing the size of corporations (using sales) with the size of nations 
(using GDP) we overestimate the relative size of corporations. In order to avoid this problem we 
computed the value added of corporations. The value added is defined as sales minus intermediate 
deliveries. Alternatively, and equivalently, it can be defined as the sum of the remuneration of 
labour and capital employed in the firm. 
We took the latter definition to compute value added. Unfortunately we could not obtain the 
relevant information for all corporations. In fact, only a few of them provide enough data from their 
annual accounts to make the calculation. We, therefore, used a sample of corporations for which 
data were available. The results for industrial corporations are shown in table 1. We observe that 
value added accounts for approximately 25% of sales. We used this number to extrapolate to other 
industrial corporations. Admittedly this is rather crude, but we are confident that the ratio of value 
added in sales is of a similar order of magnitude in most industrial companies in our sample.  
 
 Table 1: Sales and value added in five of the top  ten corporations in 2000 
Company                                 Sales                Value added            sales 
General Motors                       184.632             42.175                    22,8% 
Ford                                         170.064             46.802                    27,5% 
DaimlerChrysler                      162.384             44.438                    27,4% 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group        149.146             36.294                    24,3% 
British Petroleum                     148.062             33.536                    22,6% 
Average                                                                                             24,9% 
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Source: computed from companies’ annual accounts Note: Value added is defined as the sum 
of total wages, depreciation and amortization expenses, and profits before taxes 
The data of service companies were more difficult to collect.  Contrary to the industrial 
companies there is also a greater difference between service companies. We found that on average 
value added in service companies amounted to 35%. We apply this number to all service companies 
in the sample. To find the largest corporations in the world we used the “Fortune magazine’s Global 
500 list” of the year 2000. The source for GDP was the World Bank. We then classified countries 
and corporations according to value added (GDP). The results are shown in table 2. We now find t 
hat of the 100 largest economies, 63 are countries and 37 are corporations. More importantly, among 
the top 50 economies only 2 (Exxon, Wall Mart) are corporations. But this way of presenting the 
results does not give a right indication of relative size, because the large countries in the world are 
much larger than the largest corporations. To give some examples, the US economy is 200 times 
bigger than the biggest corporation; Japan is 100 times bigger, China 20 times bigger than the 
largest corporation. Even small countries like Belgium, Sweden, Austria are three to five times 
bigger than the largest multinational. Put more synthetically, the value added produced by the 50 
largest corporations represents only 4.5% of the value added produced by the 50 largest countries. 
Thus, as a whole the big multinationals of this world are a great deal smaller than the present anti -
globalist rhetoric has led us to believe. This is made visually very vivid in figure 1 where we present 
the same information as in table. It appears that the big multinationals (dark colour in the figure) 
belong to the league of the very small countries. (In appendix we produce the same figure, but using 
sales instead of value added to show that even when we use sales to compare with GDP, the size of 
multinationals turns out to be smaller than is suggested by the statement that out of 100 economies, 
51 are multinationals, and only 49 are countries). This is not to say that some corporations are not 
big in relation to some small countries.  
Wall Mart, the biggest company measured by value added,  is bigger than Pakistan, Peru and 
Algeria; Exxon  is bigger than the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and many other small countries. 
But the impression gained by the anti -globalist rhetoric is that corporations are now typically bigger 
than the typical country in the world. And this is manifestly incorrect (Zahedi,1983). 
 
Have big multinational become bigger?  
The second claim made by the critics of multinationals is that these  have become larger 
compared to the nation state, thereby threatening the political, social and cultural integrity of these 
nations.  But is it true that multinationals are now larger than in the past compared to countries?   
We analyze how the size of industrial corporations has grown relative to the size of countries 
from 1980 to 2000. Because of a lack of data we could not compute the value added of corporations 
in the year 1980. We, therefore, reverted to sales. However, since we only look at the growth rate of 
corporations, this is not as bad as it seems. What we implicitly do is to assume that value added and 
sales were growing at comparable rates, which is a reasonable assumption to make.  We took the 
top-50 industrial corporations from the Fortune 500 list in the years 1980 and 2000 and computed 
the growth of the sales (in constant dollars) of these top-50 corporations during 1980-2000. We 
compared this number with the growth of the world’s GDP over the same period (also in constant 
dollars). The results are shown in figure 1. The striking aspect of this result is that the world as a 
whole has grown (slightly) faster than the largest 50 corporations. As a result, in the year 2000 the 
50 largest industrial corporations were slightly smaller in relation to World GDP than the 50 largest  
corporations in 1980. Thus the big multinationals have not become bigger when compared to the 
world as a  whole. Obviously there are large regional differences. Some regions of the world have  
grown much faster than others. As a result, the big multinationals have shrunk in relative size in 
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some regions (e.g. East-Asia) while they have increased in relative size in other regions (e.g. 
Africa). We show the regional growth rates in figure 2. The interesting  aspect of these regional 
differences is that the big multinationals have shrunk in relative size in those regions where they 
have become most active (East Asia) while they have grown in relative size where big 
multinationals have been relatively absent (Africa). Thus, countries that have followed open door 
policies have been growing fast so that their size had increased faster than that of the multinationals. 
To sum up. The perception today is that multinationals are overwhelmingly large and that their size 
has increased dramatically in recent times, thereby threatening the integrity of the nation-states. 
There is no doubt that multinationals are large and that their size has increased. Surprisingly though 
multinational companies are not as big as it seems. The 37 largest corporations that appear in the list 
of the 100 largest economies create value added that represents less than 4% of the value added 
created by the top 37 countries in that list. Moreover, the multinationals have not become larger in 
relation to the nation -states during the last twenty years. Why are the perceptions so different from 
the observed facts? We return to this question in our conclusion (Elahi.1990). 
 
Size and power  
The fact that the multinationals are not as big as we thought and that they have not grown 
faster than the nation states does not say much about the power of these multinationals. The latter 
may exert considerable power, and this power may have increased. Although size and power are 
correlated, the correlation is far from perfect. Certainly, the perception today (again) is that the 
power of multinationals is large and that this power has increased. Contrary to size, power is 
difficult to measure. We can only infer indirectly how large this power is. In this connection it is 
useful to distinguish between economic and political power. With  economic power we mean the 
capacity of corporations to impose a price that exceeds marginal costs, and thereby t o make 
“excess” profits.  The extent to which corporations are capable of doing this depends on two factors. 
One is the degree of substitutability of the products these corporations sell. If consumers have easy 
alternatives, the corporation will not be able to charge prices much in excess of marginal cost. The 
second factor is competition. The smaller the number of competitors the higher the capacity of 
corporations to charge a price above marginal costs, and to make excess profits. In the limit of 
monopoly power, this capacity is at its highest. How has the economic power of corporations 
evolved during the last decades? Economists have done a lot of research on this issue. They have 
measured economic power by computing concentration indices, i.e. indices that measure the market 
share of, say, the top four companies in a given market. On the whole the empirical evidence tends 
to be inconclusive. There is no evidence that these concentration indices have increased  
systematically. In some sectors, concentration has increased, in others it has declined. For example, 
not so long ago the domestic telephone company had a local monopoly power in almost all countries 
in the world. Today, the situation is very different with several telecommunication companies 
competing in the same markets. In the market for software, concentration seems to have increased 
with one company, Microsoft, taking an increasing share of the market in many countries.  More 
than 150 years ago, Marx predicted that capitalism would increasingly lead to monopolies. The anti 
-globalist movement has espoused the same prediction. Up to now this prediction has not come 
through. It is unlikely that the anti -globalists will have a better predictive record than Marx.  What 
about the political power of corporations? Has this increased during the last decades? Political 
power is even more difficult to measure than economic power. In addition, political and economic of 
corporations are intertwined. The basic power mechanism can be described as follows. A successful 
corporation is the one, which drives out competitors because of a better and/or cheaper product. The 
ultimate success a corporation can achieve is to sell a superior product that drives out all the 
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competitors. This successful corporation then achieves a monopoly position. This is not necessarily 
a problem if new companies can enter the market. The threat of such new entries can be sufficient to 
prevent the incumbent company from abusing its monopoly power. This incumbent, however, will 
have a strong temptation to abuse its monopoly position (and to make excess profits) by erecting 
barriers to entry. The latter can, however, not easily be done except by bribing politicians who can 
erect legal barriers to entry. Thus, very successful corporations end up investing in political power, 
so as to maintain and to solidify their hold in a particular market. Has the capacity of corporations to 
engage in such practices increased? Given the nature of the problem it will be difficult to give a 
definitive answer( Najafi,2005). 
There is an indirect way to measure the evolution of the political and economic power of 
corporations. This is to analyse how quickly corporations come and go. In a world where the large 
corporations remain the same for long periods of time, it is likely th at these  corporations will be 
able to develop stronger political networks helping them to better maintain their positions in the 
market.  Conversely, when the companies at the top come and go quickly, their capacity to build up 
political power will be limited.   
In order to get some insight about this issue we analysed how quickly the composition of  the 
top-10, top-20 and top-50 industrial corporations (Fortune list) has changed since 1980. (Because of 
insufficient data for the period before 1994 we had to restrict this analysis to industrial companies). 
We show the result in figure 3. This shows how many of the initial companies appearing in the top-
10, top-20 and top-50 in 1980 remain in the top in the consecutive years (for a discussion of some 
methodological issues, see appendix). We find that in twenty years time only about half of the initial 
companies appearing in these lists have been able to keep their positions. The other half has been 
replaced by newcomers. Thus the group of large corporations is not a static one. It is continuously 
changing and renewing itself.  This is good news in the sense that a large part of those who were 
powerful in the past have lost some (or all) of their power, while others who had little power, 
increased it quickly. All this suggests that corporate power is elusive and can quickly change.   
 Since 1994 there is also information available for service companies. We did the same 
analysis for the period 1994-2000 for both the service and the industrial companies. We show the 
results in figure 4. Although the period is very short, so that strong conclusions are difficult to 
derive, it is striking to find that service companies have tended to disappear from the top positions at 
a faster rate than industrial companies (Datz.1994). 
Finally, we also analyzed the evolution of the dispersion of the size of the companies within 
each top list. The size concentration within each top list can be used as an indicator of power. The 
more unequal is the distribution of size within each top list, the greater is the potential power 
position of the companies at the top of the list. We computed the coefficient of variation and its 
evolution over time. We show the result in figure 5. It is striking to find that the coefficient of 
variation has tended to decline during 1994-2000. This suggests that the distributions of the size of 
companies in the top-10, top-20 and top-50 lists have become more equal. This in turn suggests that 
the relative power position of those at the top of the list has tended to decline. Again the period is 




Multinationals have not grown in size relative to the nation-states nor have they become 
more powerful in the last twenty years. And yet the perception is very different. This leads to the 
conclusion that what has changed is not the economic reality. The big transformation has been in the 
perception of that reality. Many people now perceive the multinationals as having grown in size and 
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power, while they did not (or not to the same  extent) 20 years ago. Why is it that perceptions can 
change so drastically while the underlying economic reality has changed so little? A satisfactory 
answer is difficult to give.  The popularity of ideas seems to evolve in a  cyclical manner very much 
like fashion does. During the 1960s and 1970s anti -capitalist  ideas were fashionable. They went 
out of fashion in the 1980s, but came back in full force during the second half of the 1990s. Maybe 
all this is inevitable in a world where the human mind tries to understand how “the system” 
functions. Faced with great uncertainty  about the functioning of the economy, people try one 
theory, then discard it to search for one that fits the data better, until the new theory is found 
wanting. The result of this  groping for understanding is that ideas and perceptions are subject to 
large cyclical movements, even if the underlying reality does not exhibit such movements.   
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